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________________
OPINION
________________
ROTH, Circuit Judge
Kevin C. Brathwaite, an inmate at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center
(Prison) in Smyrna, Delaware, is serving a life sentence for several rapes and related
felonies. He appeals the District Court’s rulings, relating to his claims that the prison’s
staff and officials violated his due process right by placing him in the prison’s security
housing unit (SHU) for almost seven years without any form of review, as well as
violating his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical attention for his serious
medical needs. The District Court ruled that Brathwaite’s due process claim was
frivolous and, later, that Brathwaite did not present the requisite expert evidence to
demonstrate his medical-related claims. For the reasons stated below, we will vacate
those rulings and remand both claims.
I. FACTS
In August 2010, Brathwaite commenced this civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against certain officials at the Prison (Prison Defendants), proceeding pro se and in
forma pauperis and alleging violations of his due process right. Specifically, Brathwaite
alleged that the Prison Defendants placed him in the SHU from 2004 through 2010 and
denied him any housing classification hearing or review, notwithstanding the fact that



This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
3

Brathwaite had completed the Prison’s internal prerequisites for being restored to general
population housing. In October 2010, Brathwaite amended his complaint to add claims
against additional individuals and the Delaware Department of Corrections.
A week later, Brathwaite filed a Second Amended Complaint, this time raising
Eighth Amendment claims against certain medical staff at the Prison (Medical
Defendants).

Brathwaite alleged that the Medical Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his medical needs stemming from a degenerative shoulder condition.1
Specifically, Brathwaite alleged that the Medical Defendants:
1.

Disregarded and failed to renew a “medical memorandum” that

documented Brathwaite’s diagnosed degenerative shoulder condition and instructed
Prison personnel to restrain Brathwaite using two, linked sets of handcuffs instead of one
set when restraining Brathwaite;
2.

Refused to deliver a mattress that had been recommended by an outside

medical professional to address Brathwaite’s spinal issues;
3.

Refused to allow Brathwaite to see his medication before it was crushed

and provided to him, despite an administrative order that instructed otherwise, due to the
fact that Brathwaite had previously been provided the wrong medication through the pill
crushing process; and
4.

Withheld his prescribed pain medication without a valid reason.

1

Although the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 675 (1962), for the sake of
simplicity, we refer to Brathwaite’s claims against the Medical Defendants as “Eighth
Amendment claims.”
4

The District Court reviewed Brathwaite’s Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915
and § 1915A, and sua sponte dismissed his due process claim as frivolous. The District
Court acknowledged that Brathwaite had spent almost seven years in the SHU, as well as
eleven to twelve days in the “hole.” It concluded, however, that, “[b]ased upon the
relatively short time Brathwaite was confined to the ‘hole,’”2 Brathwaite’s confinement
did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship in relation to other prison
conditions, the threshold for a due process violation. Specifically, the District Court did
not examine whether Brathwaite’s seven years in the SHU constituted an atypical and
significant hardship. Because the District Court determined that Brathwaite did not have
a constitutional right to a specific housing classification, the court also concluded that he
was owed no process such as classification hearings.
Following the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Brathwaite’s due process
claim, only Brathwaite’s Eighth Amendment claims against the Medical Defendants
survived. While discovery was proceeding, Brathwaite moved the District Court for
appointment of counsel to assist with discovery. The District Court denied his request,
concluding that Brathwaite was able to represent himself, but the court said that it would
revisit the issue “should the need for counsel arise later.”3
After the close of discovery, the Medical Defendants filed a motion for partial
summary judgment on Brathwaite’s Eighth Amendment claims.4 The District Court

2

A.R. 17.
A.R. 26.
4
The Medical Defendants did not move for summary judgment on Brathwaite’s claim
relating to the denial of his pain medication.
3

5

denied summary judgment on all but Brathwaite’s mattress-related claim because the
three remaining claims raised triable issues of material fact.
Rather than proceed to trial, the Medical Defendants sought leave to file a
“supplemental dispositive motion” to address whether Brathwaite could support his
remaining deliberate indifference claims without expert testimony.5 The District Court
granted the Medical Defendants’ request and re-opened discovery for an additional three
and a half weeks. The Medical Defendants then sought summary judgment on the
deliberate indifference claims on the ground that Brathwaite failed to support them with
expert testimony.

The District Court granted the motion, and specifically faulted

Brathwaite for failing to secure expert testimony during the three and a half weeks of reopened discovery.
Brathwaite appealed.6
II. DID BRATHWAITE’S CONFINEMENT IN THE SHU VIOLATE DUE
PROCESS? 7
The District Court dismissed Brathwaite’s due process claim as frivolous.8 A
claim is frivolous when it is “indisputably meritless” or “fantastic or delusional.”9 As we

5

A.R. 390-91.
We thank Brathwaite’s counsel and his firm for accepting the pro bono appointment and
for their very able representation. Lawyers who act pro bono provide the highest service
that the bar can offer.
7
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our jurisdiction pertains to all of Brathwaite’s claims notwithstanding
the fact that his notice of appeal specifies only the District Court’s order of March 17,
2015 granting summary judgment. See Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 776 (3d Cir.
1999) (liberally construing the requirement in Rule 3(c) that the notice of appeal
designate the orders being appealed).
6

6

stated in Mitchell v. Horn, “[w]e are especially careful when assessing frivolousness in
the case of in forma pauperis complaints,” and we construe pro se pleadings
“nonrestrictively.”10
To establish his due process claim, Brathwaite was required to show that (1) the
state, through the duration and conditions of his confinement, imposed “atypical and
significant hardship” on him giving rise to a protected liberty interest; and (2) the state
deprived him of the process he was due to protect that interest.11
Brathwaite has sufficiently pled that the state imposed atypical hardship on him by
placing him in the SHU for almost seven years without any meaningful review. We have
held that this inquiry requires consideration of both the duration and conditions of the
prisoner’s confinement, in relation to other prison conditions.12 Recently, we held in
Williams v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr. that solitary confinement for years on
death row of an inmate, who is not presently subject to a penalty of death, is atypical if
such confinement is essentially indefinite “with no ascertainable date for [his] release into
the general population.”13, 14

Our review of the District Court’s dismissal of Brathwaite’s claim as frivolous under
§ 1915(e)(2) is plenary. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). We must
accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn therefrom. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation
omitted).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 486 (1995); Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144
(3d Cir. 2000).
12
Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 532.
13
Williams v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 562 (3d Cir. 2017).
14
The conditions on death row are in relevant ways similar to the conditions in the SHU.
8

7

The District Court concluded that the ten to twelve days that Brathwaite was
confined in the “hole” was not atypical, but it failed to analyze Brathwaite’s claim that he
spent almost seven years in the SHU without review. In his complaint, Brathwaite
alleged that (1) he was listed on the “remain in SHU” list, and (2) he had not been
relocated to the general population even though he had completed the Prison’s requisite
programs for removal from the SHU. As in Williams, Brathwaite’s confinement in
segregated housing was allegedly indefinite and therefore atypical.15 Brathwaite’s due
process claim therefore was not frivolous.
The record, however, has not been adequately developed as to whether the
conditions of Brathwaite’s confinement constituted significant hardship. Without this
information, we are unable to conduct the “fact-intensive inquiry” necessary to determine
whether Brathwaite has identified a state-created liberty interest.16 As we did in Mitchell,
we will remand Brathwaite’s due process claim to the District Court for further
proceedings concerning the conditions of Brathwaite’s confinement.17 If the District
Court concludes that Brathwaite’s SHU confinement imposed an “atypical and significant
hardship” on him, creating a liberty interest, the court should also determine whether the

15

Williams, 848 F.3d at 562.
Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 533 (internal citation omitted).
17
Id.
16

8

Prison Defendants violated this interest by failing to provide any review to Brathwaite
during his SHU confinement.18
III. WAS EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY REQUIRED?
The District Court concluded that Brathwaite’s Eighth Amendment claims against
the Medical Defendants could not proceed to trial because one claim was disagreement
with medical treatment and thereby not a constitutional violation and because Brathwaite
had failed to support the other three claims with expert testimony. The Eighth
Amendment protects prisoners against prison official conduct that evidences “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.”19 To state a claim for deliberate indifference, a
prisoner must make “(1) a subjective showing that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to [his or her] medical needs and (2) an objective showing that those needs
were serious.”20 Though prison medical staff are usually afforded “considerable latitude
in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners,” no such deference attaches when the medical
staff has intentionally refused to provide care to a prisoner.21

18

Even if Brathwaite received a proper classification hearing after filing his Complaint,
this fact would not moot his claim for damages for the period of time he spent in the SHU
without meaningful review. See generally Melvin v. Nickolopoulos, 864 F.2d 301, 304
(3d Cir. 1988) (where state hearing eventually held, prisoner may still be entitled to
damages for amount of time in confinement before hearing date); 13C Fed. Prac. & Proc.
Juris. § 3533.3 (3d ed.) (“The availability of damages or other monetary relief almost
always avoids mootness.”).
19
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
20
Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
21
Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 227-28 (3d Cir. 2017).
9

Summary judgment should not have been granted for the Medical Defendants on
three22 of Brathwaite’s Eighth Amendment claims.23 The record indicates that the
Medical Defendants refused to double-cuff Brathwaite, even though double-cuffing had
been previously prescribed for Brathwaite’s shoulder and back issues. The record also
indicates that the Medical Defendants refused to crush Brathwaite’s pills in front of him,
despite instruction from the Prison’s grievance committee, which determined that
Brathwaite previously had been given the wrong medication in crushed form. Finally, it
appears clear from the record that, after Brathwaite filed his pill-crushing complaint with
the Prison’s grievance committee, the Medical Defendants denied Brathwaite his pain
medication altogether. As the District Court originally concluded on the Medical
Defendants’ first motion for summary judgment, “there remain genuine issues of fact” as
to these claims.24
On the Medical Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment, the District
Court changed course and held that expert testimony was required for Brathwaite to
create a triable issue of fact on his Eighth Amendment claims. It is not clear to us that
expert testimony is actually required here. For example, expert testimony is not required

22

The District Court properly granted summary judgment for the Medical Defendants on
Brathwaite’s mattress-related claim as based solely on Brathwaite’s disagreement with
the medical treatment he received, since the same doctor who originally prescribed the
mattress changed his mind seven months later. A.R. 384; see Pearson, 850 F.3d at 535.
We will therefore affirm this aspect of the District Court’s ruling.
23
“We exercise plenary review over a district court’s order granting summary judgment,
applying the same standard as the district court.” Pearson, 850 F.3d at 533. Summary
judgment will be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
24
See A.R. 383-86.
10

to demonstrate serious medical needs where the prisoner can show that his medical need
is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so
obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”25
Moreover, we recently held that a prisoner need not introduce expert testimony to
establish that defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference when the claim is premised
on the denial or delay of care.26 Unlike claims sounding in the quality of care received,
denial of care is not an “objective question typically beyond the competence of a nonmedical professional.”27 Thus, the record must be further developed on this issue.
Brathwaite would have benefited from having counsel appointed to help him to
determine whether expert testimony was needed and, if so, to obtain the requisite
testimony. Cases like Brathwaite’s are often complex and require the assistance of an
attorney who can help secure expert testimony if it is needed.28
District courts have broad discretion in determining whether to appoint counsel29
and can appoint counsel at any point in the litigation, even sua sponte.30 As we held in
Tabron v. Grace, “[i]f the district court determines that the plaintiff’s claim has arguable
25

Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir.
1987) (citation omitted); see also Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 227 (3d Cir. 2017).
26
Pearson, 850 F.3d at 535.
27
Id. at 536.
28
See Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498, 502 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Parham
v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 460 (3d Cir. 1997) (“This finding by the district court is
especially startling because when the district court denied Parham’s motion for courtappointed counsel, the district court stated that it did not seem likely that expert
testimony would be needed in this case. Yet, in dismissing the case, the same district
judge cited as a deficiency in Parham’s case the lack of expert testimony, which the
district judge now deemed essential.”).
29
Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 498.
30
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 1993).
11

merit in fact and law, the court should then consider a number of additional factors that
bear on the need for appointed counsel.”31 These factors include: 1) the plaintiff’s ability
to present his own case, 2) the complexity of the legal issues, 3) the degree to which
factual investigation will be necessary and the ability of the plaintiff to pursue
investigation, 4) the plaintiff’s capacity to retain counsel on his own, 5) the extent to
which a case is likely to turn on credibility determinations, and 6) whether the case will
require expert witness testimony.32
As already addressed, three of Brathwaite’s Eighth Amendment claims have
arguable merit in fact and law. Brathwaite also meets the majority of the Tabron factors.
Primarily, Brathwaite was unable to present his own case, especially once the
District Court determined that expert testimony was required for Brathwaite to make his
Eighth Amendment claims. Other Tabron factors also indicate the need for appointed
counsel. We have previously held that a deliberate indifference case like this one
involves complex legal issues,33 and may require expert testimony.34 Additionally, the
record reveals that Brathwaite cannot afford to retain his own counsel, as evidenced by
Brathwaite’s in forma pauperis status.35
In sum, the District Court should have appointed counsel for Brathwaite; it
therefore abused its discretion by failing to do so. Even if the District Court did not deem
31

Id. at 155.
Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 499.
33
See Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 502 (“[A] § 1983 civil rights case alleging deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs can raise sufficiently complex legal
issues to require appointment of counsel.” (citing Parham, 126 F.3d at 459)).
34
See Parham, 126 F.3d at 460.
35
See Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 505.
32
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it necessary at the time of Brathwaite’s motion for appointed counsel, it should have
appointed pro bono counsel when it determined that expert testimony would be
necessary.36
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s ruling as to Brathwaite’s
mattress-related claim and vacate the District Court’s rulings on the remainder of the
Eighth Amendment claims, as well as its rulings on Brathwaite’s due process claim and
request for appointed counsel, and we will remand the case to the District Court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

36

See also Tabron, 6 F.3d at 156 (decision to appoint counsel can be made at any point in
the litigation).
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